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A NEW STRATEGY FOR REGULATING
ARBITRATION
Sarath Sanga
ABSTRACT—Confidential arbitration is a standard precondition to
employment. But confidential arbitration prevents a state from ensuring or
even knowing whether employees’ economic, civil, and due process rights
are respected. Further, employers regularly require employees to waive
rights to class proceedings (thereby foreclosing small claims) and to arbitrate
under the laws of another jurisdiction (thereby evading mandatory state law).
In response, states have tried to regulate arbitration provisions, arbitral
awards, and arbitral processes. But these efforts have all failed because the
Supreme Court says they are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
In this Article, I argue that states can and should adopt a new strategy:
Deter parties from forming such contracts in the first place.
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I explain the problem. Over
the last fifty years, the Supreme Court systematically immunized arbitration
provisions against every plausible contract defense. Yet the Supreme Court
continues to insist that, just as the Federal Arbitration Act requires,
arbitration agreements are still subject to “generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”1 This is false.
Second, I present the first large-scale evidence on the pervasiveness of
arbitration. The Supreme Court’s arbitration precedents have effect only to
the extent private parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. To study this, I use
machine-learning protocols to parse millions of filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts
formed by public companies. These contracts include employment
agreements, credit agreements, joint ventures, purchases, and others.
Employment contracts are by far the most likely to include a mandatory
arbitration provision.
Finally, I argue that, because the Supreme Court has all but stripped
states of their power to enforce contracts, states should adopt policies that
deter formation of objectionable contracts. For example, states cannot
prohibit forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims. They can, however,
prohibit sexual harassment as a subject matter for employment contracts;
1

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
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they can also enforce this with civil penalties and whistleblower rewards.
Similarly, states cannot stop an employer from arbitrating under the laws of
another jurisdiction, thereby evading mandatory limits on noncompete
agreements. But states can declare noncompetes illegal, levy civil fines on
employers that form them, and again offer employees whistleblower rewards
to report violations. These approaches work because they create a cause of
action for a third party—the state—who is not subject to the arbitration
agreement. And unlike past efforts, these laws would not be preempted
because they do not “derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to
arbitrate is at issue.”2
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INTRODUCTION
In Tishomingo, a small town in southern Oklahoma, Eddie Lee Howard
entered into a seemingly unenforceable contract.3 Howard had agreed to
work for Nitro-Lift, a company that supplies nitrogen to oil and gas
extractors. He also agreed not to work for any competing business for two
years after leaving Nitro-Lift.4 This last provision—a standard covenant not
to compete—is valid and enforceable in nearly every state.
But not in Oklahoma. Under Oklahoma law,
[a] person who makes an agreement with an employer . . . not to compete with
the employer after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the former
employer [and] . . . any provision in a contract between an employer and an
employee [to the contrary] shall be void and unenforceable. 5

Howard put this law to the test. He left Nitro-Lift and immediately went
to work for a competing business. He also filed suit in the District Court of
Johnston County, Oklahoma, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
covenant not to compete was void and unenforceable. As a matter of law, the
noncompete was indeed void. But Howard had a problem: his contract also
contained a broad arbitration agreement that required him to submit any
dispute to an arbitrator. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), along with a
mountain of Supreme Court precedent, left no doubt that this provision must
be specifically enforced.6 Recognizing this, the trial court dutifully applied
federal law and dismissed Howard’s claim.7
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, had other ideas. It reversed
the trial court and declared that “the existence of an arbitration agreement in
an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying
agreement.”8 The Oklahoma court must have known that it was clearly
disregarding federal law, which unambiguously provides that an arbitration
agreement in an employment contract does prohibit judicial review.9
Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a judgment in favor of
Howard and voided the noncompete. Nitro-Lift appealed.
3

The facts come from Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 24–25 (Okla. 2011).
Id. at 24 n.8. It further provided that a “competing business” was any business engaged in “the use
of non-cryogenically generated nitrogen for applications on wellsites in the oil and gas industry in the
United States.” Id. (insertions omitted).
5 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A(A)–(B) (West 2018).
6 See infra Part I.
7 Howard, 273 P.3d at 25.
8 Id. at 23.
9 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984).
4
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The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed. In a terse per curiam
opinion, it admonished the Oklahoma Supreme Court for “disregard[ing] this
Court’s precedents on the FAA”10 and “insist[ing] that its own jurisprudence
control[led] this issue.”11 It also reminded Oklahoma of what should have
been obvious: “[T]he FAA . . . is ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’”12 and
“once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that
understanding of the governing rule of law.”13
The U.S. Supreme Court was correct. Yet the Oklahoma court had its
reasons. The problem in Nitro-Lift v. Howard was that arbitration might have
led to enforcement of the noncompete—in contravention of (seemingly)
mandatory state law. Why? Because Howard’s contract provided not only
that arbitration would take place outside of Oklahoma (in Houston, Texas)
but also, crucially, that the arbitrator would apply Louisiana law. Under
Louisiana law, Howard’s noncompete would be valid and enforceable.14
The result thus hinged on the forum. An Oklahoma court would
disregard the choice of Louisiana law and void the noncompete.15 What is
not clear, however, is whether an arbitrator would conduct the same conflict
of laws analysis. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has all but encouraged
arbitrators to ignore the “complexity and uncertainty” of conflict of laws and
simply apply the law that the parties chose.16 If an arbitrator were to heed the
U.S. Supreme Court’s advice, apply Louisiana law, and issue an award
upholding the noncompete, then the FAA would leave Oklahoma state courts
no choice but to enforce that award, even if it clearly erred in its conflict of
law analysis, and even if enforcement would contravene Oklahoma policy.17
Nitro-Lift teaches us what most sophisticated parties already know: contracts

10
11
12
13
14

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20 (2012).
Id. at 21 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2).
Id. (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994)).
Section 23:921(C) of the Louisiana code provides:

Any person . . . who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer
to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer . . . [for a
period] not to exceed . . . two years from termination of employment.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (2018) (emphasis added).
15 The Oklahoma Supreme Court referenced the parties’ choice of Louisiana law, but did not even
consider the potential conflicts analysis. Instead, it tacitly held that the Oklahoma statute applies
regardless of the parties’ choice of law. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 24, 26–29
(Okla. 2011).
16 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); see infra Section III.B.
17 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012) (providing the exclusive grounds for vacatur and modification of
awards, which does not include public policy grounds); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10
(1984), discussed in Section I.D, below.
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can bootstrap their way out of mandatory state law by pairing an arbitration
provision with a choice of law clause.18
States, it would seem, are powerless to stop this. Under federal law and
Supreme Court precedent, there is virtually no circumstance under which a
state or federal court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement or
arbitral award.19 Even awards that make egregious errors in law must be
enforced.20 But states have an interest in ensuring the enforcement of their
own laws. They also have an interest in ensuring certain procedural
protections for employees that a confidential, one-on-one proceeding cannot
provide.21 Given these interests and the constraints of federal arbitration law,
what can states do?
In this Article, I propose a new strategy for states. The principle is to
regulate contract formation, not contract enforcement. States should abandon
contract enforcement as a policy lever—as federal arbitration law has all but
forced this result. Instead, states should focus on deterring formation of
contracts that would undermine state policies. This strategy leverages a
simple fact: Arbitration requires a contract. Thus, no contract means no
arbitration.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Throughout, I focus on the case of
employment arbitration.
Part I reviews the last fifty years of Supreme Court arbitration
jurisprudence. The story, as I see it, is quite unsatisfying. Modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence is primarily based not on the federal statute that governs
arbitration (the FAA), but on a “national policy favoring arbitration.”22 The
unsatisfying part is that this policy is a mistake—and not in the sense that it
strikes the wrong balance. Rather, it is a mistake because it is based on an

18 On choice of law in contracts generally, see Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis,
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894 (2014), which analyzed all choice of law clauses in material contracts
disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The most common choice was New York (27%),
followed by Delaware (12%), and California (11%). Id. at 906 tbl.2.
19 See infra Part I (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
20 See infra Section I.D.
21 Arbitrators are not under any obligation to adopt rules to ensure fairness of process in any part of
the proceeding. Thus, basic rules such as service of process that apply in state and federal courts (e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 5) do not apply in arbitration. Further, arbitrators are not under any obligation to justify
their awards in any way, such as by giving reasons in writing or orally. United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (“Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give
their reasons for an award.”). The sole limits on arbitral process are listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10. These are
restricted to egregious cases such as fraud, corruption, or refusal to hear evidence from one side.
22 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration.”).
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erroneous citation to an early Supreme Court case, a case that all but
expressly concludes that no such policy exists.23
Beginning in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating24 and
continuing to the present, the Supreme Court leveraged this policy to both
expand the scope of the FAA and effectively eliminate its primary
exception.25 The primary exception, found in Section 2, provides that
agreements to arbitrate are generally enforceable “save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”26 Over the
decades, the Court refined its interpretation of this so-called “saving clause,”
systematically foreclosing nearly all plausible contract defenses. It has also
foreclosed defenses against arbitration’s “fundamental attributes”—most
notoriously, defenses against class waivers.27 Yet despite these profound
limitations on contract defenses, the Court continues to insist that the Section
2 saving clause is alive, and that arbitration provisions are still subject to
“generally applicable contract defenses.”28 This is false.29
These developments only have practical effect to the extent that
contract parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. Part II presents new evidence
on the pervasiveness of employment arbitration. I use machine-learning
protocols to analyze the text of millions of filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts
formed by public companies. These contracts cover executive employment,
23 See infra Part I (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
Prima Paint expressly states that its holding, though inspired by a Second Circuit opinion that argues
toward the existence of a “national substantive law,” was based solely on the text of the FAA. 388 U.S.
at 399–400.
24 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
25 Many scholars have criticized Southland’s application of the FAA to state courts. See, e.g., IAN R.
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (1994); Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1469 (1996); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role
in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004). For a summary of this literature, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 400 n.57 (2004). For a notable exception to this wave of
criticism, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).
26 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
27 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (finding that an agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes individually does not bar employees from engaging in “concerted activities” and
therefore does not violate the National Labor Relations Act); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 341–44 (2011) (holding that Section 2 preempts California’s Discover Bank test, under
which class action waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable).
28 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
29 See infra Section I.C.
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credit agreements, joint ventures, purchases, and others. I show that
employment contracts are by far the most likely to include a mandatory
arbitration provision, and further that the difference between employment
contracts and all others has been stable for the last twenty years. The data
confirm what most have suspected: Employment arbitration is pervasive and
here to stay.
Finally, Part III offers a new strategy to states for regulating
employment arbitration. The question is, How can states enforce mandatory
laws in contract actions when federal arbitration policy enables employers to
opt out? The answer is simple: They cannot. Therefore, states should not rely
on contract enforcement (or nonenforcement) to advance public policy.
Instead, they should deter parties from forming contracts that would
undermine state policy.
I offer two examples of how states can deploy this strategy. The first
comes from employment covenants not to compete. Some states void postemployment covenants not to compete, but parties circumvent this by
agreeing to arbitrate disputes under a more permissive law (as in Nitro-Lift,
above). But instead of merely voiding noncompetes, states should offer
employees whistleblower rewards (financed by employers) for notifying
state authorities that their employer subjects employees to noncompetes.30
The employee may demonstrate this, for example, by showing that their own
employment contract includes a noncompete. This policy would discourage
employers and employees from forming, performing, or arbitrating
noncompetes. Crucially, this policy would not be preempted by federal
arbitration law because it does not regulate (let alone prohibit) arbitration.
The second example comes from the arbitration of civil rights claims.
States and the public have an interest in ensuring certain procedural
protections for employees pursuing these claims. Confidentiality in
arbitration proceedings prevents a state from knowing whether these
protections are in fact provided, or indeed whether civil rights are
meaningfully enforced. Federal law would preempt any direct effort by states
to prevent arbitration of any class of disputes. The strategy, therefore, is not
to prohibit arbitration but instead to incentivize employers to give employees
the option to litigate or arbitrate. States can do this by adopting an
overinclusive policy: a blanket prohibition on civil rights as a subject matter
for employment contracts. The prohibition could alternatively be for specific
classes of civil rights disputes, such as sexual harassment claims. A subject
30 In response to Concepcion (under which courts must enforce class action waivers), Professor Janet
Alexander similarly argues that states can use qui tam actions to effectively recreate small-claims class
actions. Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to
Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203 (2013).
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matter prohibition, when again coupled with whistleblower rewards, can be
structured to effectively grant employees the option to proceed (or not) to
arbitration after a dispute arises.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what this Article does and does not do.
This Article does not argue in favor of or against arbitration per se as a
dispute resolution system. Indeed, it does not even summarize the usual
arguments. These arguments, as well as the relative merits of each state’s
policies, are orthogonal to the objectives of this Article. Rather, the objective
of this Article is to diagnose a fundamental problem in contract
enforcement—and then to offer one solution. The problem is that federal
arbitration law prevents a state from ensuring that its laws are enforced in
contract actions. The solution is that states should forget about contract
enforcement and shift their focus to deterring contract formation.
I.

HOW STATES LOST CONTROL OVER CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

In this Part, I begin by showing how U.S. Supreme Court precedent
immunized agreements to arbitrate from virtually all plausible contract
defenses. I identify the origins of the Supreme Court’s “national policy
favoring arbitration,” which forms the basis of most modern FAA cases. I
then briefly consider the Court’s treatment of the enforceability of arbitration
awards. I conclude by identifying a possible limiting principle to the
otherwise seemingly unlimited ability of private parties to use arbitration to
evade mandatory state law.
A. The Supreme Court’s Position
It is self-evident that the Federal Arbitration Act provides some
circumstances under which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement. This is because Section 2 provides that, in almost31 all contracts
“involving commerce,” a written agreement to arbitrate “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”32
The Supreme Court seemingly agrees. On several occasions, it has held
that arbitration provisions are subject to standard contract defenses raised by
private parties. Under the saving clause of Section 2, it claims, “generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.”33 The Court has also

31

See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (providing exceptions).
Id. § 2.
33 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
32
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assured state lawmakers that the saving clause “gives States a method for
protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an
unwanted arbitration provision.”34 Moreover, it permits states to “regulate
contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles.”35
But this is false. The Supreme Court says one thing when it has in fact
done another. Over the last fifty years, the Court has foreclosed nearly every
plausible circumstance under which private parties may raise a “generally
applicable contract defense[]”36 or states “may regulate . . . arbitration
clauses.”37 Simply put, the saving clause of Section 2 has no bite. The rest of
this Part investigates this claim in detail.
B. The “National Policy Favoring Arbitration”
1. Dubious Origins
The core of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence lies not in
the federal statute, but in the “national policy favoring arbitration.”38 This
policy is cited as a foundational basis for nearly every FAA decision since
the mid-1980s.39 But what is this policy? And where does it come from?
The Court’s first reference to the policy—or rather its first reference to
the idea that it exists—appeared in 1967 in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,40 forty years after the enactment of the FAA.41
The plaintiff, Prima Paint, had purchased Flood & Conklin’s (F&C’s) paint

477, 483–84 (1989); and Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)); see also
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
34 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281.
35 Id.
36 Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
37 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. After surveying the case law and how it would apply
to the most common contract defenses in Section I.C, I identify only one plausible contract defense that,
if applied to one specific circumstance, might trigger the saving clause: A actually knows that B would
never agree to arbitrate; A tells B that the contract does not include an arbitration provision (when in fact
A knows that it does); B, relying on this misrepresentation, manifests assent. This is not a meaningful
limitation because it does not stop parties from intentionally escaping mandatory contract law. See below.
38 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
39 See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 17 (2012); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346, 353 (2008) (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 10). The Supreme Court’s deferential approach to
arbitration predates the FAA. As early as 1854, it asserted that, when reviewing arbitral awards, “[e]very
presumption is in favor of the validity of the award” and that a court required more than mere error in
fact or law, but an egregious procedural misconduct “such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross
mistake.” Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349–51 (1854).
40 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
41 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2012)), available at http://legisworks.org/sal/43/stats/STATUTE-43-Pg883.pdf [https://perma.cc/
THJ2-NV48].
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business and customer lists.42 It also secured ongoing consulting services
from F&C, along with a promise that F&C not compete with Prima Paint in
the painting business.43 However, one week after making this promise, and
to the surprise of Prima Paint, F&C filed for bankruptcy.44 Thus, Prima Paint
would obtain F&C’s business and customer lists, but not its consulting
services.45 Worst of all, F&C’s promise not to compete turned out to be
worthless, as there was now no F&C to speak of.46
Prima Paint filed suit for fraud in the inducement, claiming that F&C
had knowingly misrepresented its financial position so that it could “sell” the
worthless noncompete and consulting retainer.47 F&C moved to compel
arbitration under its contract’s broad arbitration provision.48 The issue before
the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a claim for fraud in the inducement
must be sent to the arbitrator. 49
The majority concluded yes: the FAA, it reasoned, provides the
“explicit answer.”50 Section 4 provides that a court shall compel arbitration
“upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is
not in issue.”51 In this case, plaintiff’s claim was for fraud in the inducement
of the contract as a whole—not for fraud in the inducement of the agreement
to arbitrate specifically.52 Therefore, as far as the Court was concerned, the
“making of the agreement for arbitration” was not at issue, and the Court
sent the case to an arbitrator.53 Under this reasoning, any formation defense
concerning the contract as a whole must be sent to an arbitrator.
The problem with this reasoning is that fraudulent inducement of the
contract could imply fraudulent inducement of each of its provisions. Section
4 is therefore ambiguous at best. It does not provide an “explicit answer.”54
It only compels another question: whether fraud in the whole implies fraud
in each part. Nevertheless, the Court admitted no such ambiguity and held
that a claim for fraud in the inducement must be sent to an arbitrator.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
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Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 403.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402.
Id. at 403–04, 406–07.
Id. at 403.
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Prima Paint wiped out an entire class of circumstances under which a
court could cite the saving clause of Section 2 to refuse to enforce an
arbitration agreement. Logically, we may partition all such circumstances
into two classes of cases: (1) cases in which there are “grounds . . . at law or
in equity”55 to revoke the entire contract and (2) cases in which there are
“grounds . . . at law or in equity” to revoke the arbitration provision
specifically. Prima Paint rules out the first.
The Prima Paint majority does not mention any national arbitration
policy, let alone one that could favor or disfavor arbitration. For that, we
must turn to the dissent.
Justice Hugo Black’s dissent took issue with much of the majority’s
opinion. His principal criticism56 concerned the majority’s express reliance
on the Second Circuit’s decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc.57 Ten years prior, Robert Lawrence had reached a similar
conclusion, that formation of an agreement to arbitrate is, for the purposes
of Section 2 of the FAA, treated separately from formation of the contract.58
This has since been dubbed the “separability rule.”59
What the Prima Paint majority failed to mention, argued Justice Black,
was that Robert Lawrence was not decided on the basis of Section 4.60 Rather,
the Second Circuit based its opinion on “a reasonably clear legislative intent
to create a new body of substantive law relative to arbitration agreements,”61
one that “encompasses questions of interpretation and construction as well
as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration
agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs.”62
But the intervening juggernaut of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,63
decided after the FAA but before Robert Lawrence, should have compelled
the Second Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion.64 Erie would require the
Second Circuit to apply New York law. At the time, New York law did not

55

9 U.S.C. § 2.
See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421–22 (Black, J., dissenting).
57 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
58 Id. at 409–10.
59 STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.24 (2001). For critiques of the
separability rule, see Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819,
841–48 (2003).
60 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting).
61 Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 404.
62 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d
at 409).
63 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
64 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 424–25 (Black, J., dissenting).
56
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recognize any “separability rule.” On the contrary, “[u]nder New York
law . . . general allegations of fraud in the inducement would . . . put in issue
the making of the arbitration clause,” thereby failing Section 4’s condition
and permitting a court to refuse to compel arbitration.65 The Second Circuit
in Robert Lawrence ignored this; contravening Erie and New York law, it
fashioned the separability rule as a doctrine within the new “body of federal
substantive law.”66 It did so, wrote Justice Black, “not because § 4 provided
this rule as an ‘explicit answer,’ not because [it] looked to the intention of
the parties, but because of [its] notion that the separability rule would further
a ‘liberal policy of promoting arbitration.’”67 This statement—Justice
Black’s quotation of the Second Circuit’s appeal to a “liberal policy of
promoting arbitration”—is the first instance in which the Supreme Court
references the idea that there exists a policy favoring arbitration.
Justice Black had argued in dissent that no such policy exists, but
Robert Lawrence was adamant that it did. Robert Lawrence insisted that such
a policy had been “consistently reiterated by the federal courts.”68 To support
this assertion, Robert Lawrence cited several cases from the Second and
Eighth Circuits.69 It also cited an early FAA decision of the Supreme Court,
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp.,70 which
upheld a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. But this last citation
is inapposite. Shanferoke is a straightforward application of the FAA. It
neither refers to nor hints at a latent national policy, nor does it offer guidance
on interpreting the FAA.
In any event, here in the dissent to Prima Paint lie the dubious origins
of the national policy favoring arbitration—dubious because even the
majority dismisses it. Though the Prima Paint majority expressly endorses
Robert Lawrence’s holding, it also expressly disavows its rationale,71 instead
65

Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
67 Id. at 421. According to the Second Circuit, “doubts as to the construction of the [FAA] ought to
be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration.” Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at
410.
68 Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 410.
69 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); Wabash R. Co. v. Am. Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335, 351 (8th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926).
70
293 U.S. 449 (1935).
71 The majority noted that under Robert Lawrence,
66

a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally—as opposed to the arbitration clause
itself—is for the arbitrators and not for the courts; and that this rule—one of “national substantive
law”—governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. We agree, albeit for somewhat different
reasons, and we affirm the decision below.
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choosing to ground its holding in the text of the FAA.72 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s original position on the existence and implications of a “national
policy favoring arbitration” was either “no comment” (per the majority) or
“nonexistent” (per the dissent).
But the Supreme Court would later see things differently. Fifteen years
after Prima Paint, the Court made its second reference to the “national
policy”—and on very different terms. We find this reference in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,73 an abstention
case that only tangentially implicates the FAA. In Moses, the Court remarked
in dicta that Prima Paint established that “Section 2 is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”74
This is wrong.75 The “liberal federal policy” language comes from the
dissent. The Prima Paint majority expressly disavows such arguments.76 In
fact, in its sole reference to any policy, purpose, or congressional intent, the
Prima Paint majority conveys the opposite sentiment: “[T]he purpose of [the
FAA],” it wrote, “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so.”77 It further expressly states that it does not rely
on Robert Lawrence’s reasoning on the policy goals of the FAA, and that its
holding is based only on the “plain meaning”78 interpretation of Sections 3
and 4.79

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967) (footnote omitted).
72 See id. (“We agree [with the decision below], albeit for somewhat different reasons, and we affirm
the decision below.”) (emphasis added).
73 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
74 Id. at 24. It further noted that “[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability” and that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24–25.
75 Previous scholarship on Moses has remarked that “[t]he so-called policy favoring arbitration
appears to be one created by the judiciary out of whole cloth.” Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 123 (2006). I, however, attribute its creation to an embarrassing
error on the part of the Moses court: the Moses court must have read the Prima Paint dissent’s discussion
of Robert Lawrence and mistaken it for the Prima Paint majority’s own reasoning. See below.
76 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 399–400.
77 Id. at 404 n.12; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1645 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the same). On this point, the dissent agreed: “The avowed purpose of the Act was to
place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’” Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at
423 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)).
78 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
79 Id. at 399–400 (agreeing with the outcome of Robert Lawrence, but for different reasons); id. at
403–04 (interpreting Section 4).
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The Moses court made an embarrassing mistake. It must have read
Justice Black’s critique of Robert Lawrence and then mistakenly presumed
he was critiquing the Prima Paint majority. Then again, the Moses dicta was
just that—dicta. It had no bearing on the case at hand. It might have been
forgotten.
2. Expansion to State Court
Moses was not forgotten. The third and most consequential reference to
the national policy is found in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating.80
The majority would base its entire argument on a citation to the national
policy statement from Moses. This case would also mark the beginning of
the end of mandatory contract law.
Southland issued two holdings, one general, the other specific. The
general holding is that the FAA applies not just in federal court but also in
state court.81 The specific holding is that the saving clause did not apply to
the arbitration provision at issue.82 The specific holding, and particularly the
process by which it was reached, is what marks the beginning of the end of
mandatory contract law. Yet the specific holding is also the least
remembered. Indeed, neither the majority nor the dissent paid any attention
to it. I next consider each holding in turn.
Southland originated in state court, and so the threshold question was
whether the FAA applied.83 First, consider Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
answer. Writing in dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the FAA’s direct
references to federal courts, along with the conspicuous absence of any
reference to state courts, were sufficient to conclude that the FAA applied
only in the former.84 Section 4 provides that a party aggrieved by another’s
refusal to arbitrate “may petition any United States district court . . . for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.”85
Section 3 further provides that
[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . the court . . . shall on application of

80

465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
Id. at 14–15.
82 Id. at 15 (“[I]t is clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a
federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable.”).
83 If it did, then two subsequent questions would emerge: Did Section 2 oblige the state court to
enforce the arbitration provision at issue? And did Section 4 further oblige the state court to specifically
enforce the arbitration provision at issue? These questions were never directly posed by the Court. Instead,
the Court declared that the answers to these questions were “clear beyond question.” Id.
84 Id. at 22–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 22 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
81
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one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 86

In Justice O’Connor’s view, this was sufficient to hold that the FAA applies
only in federal court. The reasoning, it would seem, is self-evident. The
statute does not say “court” or “any court.” It says “United States district
court.” For Justice O’Connor, this was as plain as plain meaning could be.87
But the majority held otherwise. The majority did not address or even
acknowledge the references to “United States courts” in Sections 3 and 4.
The sole basis for its opinion is a citation to Moses for the proposition that
“[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration.”88 This policy, it held, was sufficient to conclude that
the FAA—in its entirety—applies to state courts.89 Thus, what began as an
embarrassing mistake in Moses became the foundation for the Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence.
3. States Strike Back
Southland is the watershed arbitration case. It expanded the FAA’s
jurisdictional scope—and therefore the extent to which parties could
specifically enforce an arbitration provision. Before Southland, a contract
needed an independent jurisdictional hook to make it into federal court and
trigger the application of the FAA’s specific performance remedy. Typically,
the hook was diversity.90 An arbitration provision, by itself, was not—and
86

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).
Id. at 29. Justice O’Connor also cites Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 30. For example, the holding
in Prima Paint expressly applied to federal courts. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (“We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a [Section 3] application for a stay
while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and
performance of the agreement to arbitrate.” (emphasis added)).
88 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (majority opinion).
89 Id. The majority also offered a quasi-textual (and nonsensical) argument: Congress could have
directed federal courts to specifically enforce all arbitration provisions, not just those in contracts
“involving commerce.” Because Congress limited the Act to contracts within the reach of the Commerce
Clause, it must have intended the Act to apply in both federal and state courts. Id. at 15. This is nonsense
because Congress could have intended both. That is, Congress could have intended the Act to apply only
to contracts that (1) are litigated in federal courts and (2) involve commerce. Justice Thomas similarly
observed that the Section 2 argument was, in his words, the Southland majority’s only “real response” to
Sections 3 and 4 of the statute. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995).
87

Yet Congress might well have thought that even if it could have called upon federal courts to
enforce arbitration agreements in every single case that came before them, there was no federal
interest in doing so unless interstate commerce or maritime transactions were involved. This
conclusion is far more plausible.
Id. Indeed, there would be no federal interest in disturbing the jurisdiction of state courts over
noncommercial contracts, such as agreements under family law.
90 Until 2009, it was not clear whether a court may alternatively rely on the federal nature of the
underlying dispute as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53
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still is not—sufficient grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction.91 After
Southland, no such hook was needed. Specific performance was now
available in state court. Parties to any contract “involving commerce” could
now specifically enforce a valid arbitration provision.
Southland is also a turning point for the Supreme Court’s docket.
Table 1 shows that the volume of its arbitration cases increased significantly,
while Figure 1 shows that arbitration-related disputes continue to consume
an ever-increasing share of the Court’s caseload.92
Some of these cases were pushback, if not outright rebellion, by state
supreme courts. These cases pushed back against the U.S. Supreme Court’s
ever-expanding theory of the scope of FAA preemption. Some states simply
ignored unambiguous U.S. Supreme Court precedent.93 Other states were
openly hostile. Southland, wrote one state supreme court justice,
“bludgeoned the [FAA] . . . . If the liberties in statutory construction taken
by the Supreme Court in Southland hint at the horizons of American
jurisprudence, I shudder to think what atrocities might follow.”94 Southland’s
reasoning, wrote another state supreme court justice, was “tendentious,”

(2009), the Supreme Court decided that it could; see also Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 319, 343–47 (2007) (analyzing
arguments for and against such a basis).
91 Section 4 provides that
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28 . . . for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (emphasis added). Southland did not change this. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9; see
also id. at 24.
92 The data come from the Supreme Court Database. See Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2017 Supreme Court
Database, Version 2017 Release 01, http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/UD9P-8G5G]. A
case is defined as “arbitration-related” if the database identifies its sole issue as “arbitration.”
Qualitatively similar results are obtained if one also counts cases for which “arbitration” is one of the
case’s many issues.
93 For example, in one case from Alabama, the state court reversed a motion to compel arbitration
on the rationale that debt contracts did not fall under the Commerce Clause. Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens
Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 808 (Ala. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 52 (2003). In another case from Florida, KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So. 3d 1165, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), vacated, 565 U.S. 18 (2011), the state
court held that when a contract includes both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, the FAA permits courts
to refuse to compel arbitration of any claim. This directly violated a categorical rule issued by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 244 (1985) (requiring a court to
compel arbitration of the arbitrable claims).
94 Ex parte Ala. Oxygen Co., 452 So. 2d 860, 861 (Ala. 1984) (Embry, J., dissenting). In the same
Term that Southland was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated an Alabama Supreme Court decision
that directly conflicted with its holding. York Int’l v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 465 U.S. 1016 (1984). On remand,
the Alabama Supreme Court duly reversed its own holding. Ex parte Ala. Oxygen Co., 452 So. 2d at 861.
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“created from whole cloth,” and “[c]ontrary to the intended purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act.”95
In reply to these and other state court mutinies, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its own set of return volleys: “The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia . . . misrea[d] and disregard[ed] the precedents of this Court.”96
“The Supreme Court of Alabama was . . . misguided.”97 Similar rebukes can
be found against Oklahoma98 and Montana.99 These rebukes quelled some
states, while further emboldening others, including both state courts100 and
state legislatures.101
TABLE 1: U.S. SUPREME COURT CASELOAD

Number of arbitrationrelated cases
Percent of total cases that
are arbitration-related
Years

Pre-Southland

Post-Southland

5

20

0.08%

0.55%

1946–1983

1985–2016

Source: SUPREME COURT DATABASE.

95 Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278–79 (W. Va. 2011), vacated
sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012).
96 Marmet Health Care Ctr., 565 U.S. at 531.
97 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
98 Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20 (2012) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
decision disregards this Court’s precedents on the FAA.”).
99 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
100 Montana, for instance, continues to ignore U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its arbitration
decisions. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 494 (Mont. 2009) (invalidating all arbitration
provisions in contracts of adhesion if they are outside a party’s reasonable expectations).
101 Even after Southland (and perhaps because of it), many states enacted laws regulating arbitration.
Some states continue to maintain laws that would clearly be preempted under Supreme Court precedent.
Georgia, for example, requires that employees specifically initial the arbitration clause. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-2(c)(9) (2018). California prohibits arbitration for claims of unpaid wages. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229
(West 2018). A Kentucky law mirroring the FAA previously excluded all employment agreements. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2018). But this was preempted by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001). See In re Transp. Assocs., Inc., 263 B.R. 531, 533–34 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001); see
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (2017) (requiring arbitration agreements to be on the first page of a
contract) (preempted in Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681, and section (4) was subsequently repealed);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (2018) (similar).
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FIGURE 1: ARBITRATION-RELATED CASELOAD OVER TIME
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C. The End of Contract Defenses
1. The Key Move
Southland’s general holding—applying the FAA to state courts—has
been roundly criticized by scholars.102 But it is its second holding that has led
to the unraveling of mandatory contract law.
The second holding tacitly placed a new limit on the saving clause of
Section 2. Recall that Prima Paint rules out cases for which there exist
“grounds . . . at law or in equity”103 to revoke the entire contract. Thus, even
before Southland, a court could refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
only if there were “grounds . . . at law or in equity” to revoke the arbitration
provision specifically.
The arbitration provision at issue in Southland came from the standard
franchise agreement of Southland Corporation (the erstwhile corporate name
of 7-Eleven). The California Supreme Court, construing a section of the
California Franchise Investment Law,104 held that Southland’s arbitration
provision was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. It reasoned that a
U.S. Supreme Court case from thirty years prior, Wilko v. Swan,105 compelled
this conclusion because Wilko had similarly construed an identically worded

102

See supra note 25.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
104 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (2018) (“Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule
or order hereunder is void.”).
105 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
103
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federal statute.106 Thus, to specifically enforce the arbitration provision, the
Southland majority’s opinion needed not only to hold that the FAA applies
in state court but also that it preempts the California Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its statute as “grounds as exist at law or in equity” upon
which to refuse enforcement.107
The Court so held. The body of the majority opinion provides no reason
for this holding.108 But a final footnote offers a hint:
[A] party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid
enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the
defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not
a ground that exists at law or in equity “for the revocation of any contract” but
merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in
contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law. 109

The idea, it seems, is that state law cannot single out arbitration. The
Supreme Court slowly refined this idea over time. The first refinement
appeared in Perry v. Thomas110:
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to the saving
clause] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally. . . . [A] court [may not] rely on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding . . . .111

The idea then crystalized in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion112: “[The]
saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but
not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”113 The now-familiar
refrain has appeared most recently in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: “[T]he
saving clause recognizes only defenses that apply to ‘any’ contract. In this

106 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012). Four years after Southland, Wilko was
overruled. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
107 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
108 In its sole reference to the second issue, the Court wrote only that “it is clear beyond question that
if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would
have been enforceable.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). The dissent, for its part, did
not mention the Court’s second holding.
109 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
110 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
111 Id. at 493 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
112 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) (analyzing the implications of Concepcion).
113 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)) (quotations omitted).
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way the clause establishes a sort of ‘equal-treatment’ rule for arbitration
contracts.”114
If one were to take these statements at face value, one might conclude
that the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a position of neutrality or “equal
treatment” with respect to arbitration. But while the logic of “general
applicability” sounds neutral in theory, in practice it is not.
The problem is that when the Supreme Court applies this idea to actual
cases, it mischaracterizes the nature of a “generally applicable” contract
defense. What makes a contract defense “generally applicable”? The answer
is not that, when applied, the argument advancing the defense eschews
specificity or merely calls upon some general proposition like “pacta sunt
servanda” (agreements must be kept). “General propositions do not decide
concrete cases.”115 There is no such thing as a “general” contract argument.
Rather, what makes a defense generally applicable is that the style of
argument could apply to a diversity of exchanges. When applied to an actual
case, a general defense necessarily derives its meaning from specific facts of
that exchange. To argue a general defense such as unconscionability or fraud,
one must attack a specific provision of the agreement, or a specific
representation of one party, or a specific belief of one party, or a specific fact
of the world—or some combination thereof. Thus, a generally applicable
defense, while general in theory, is necessarily specific in application.
The Supreme Court’s key move—the one that quietly annihilates a
whole class of potential defenses—is that it characterizes a “generally
applicable” defense as one that does not “derive [its] meaning from” a
specific fact of arbitration. The move here is not to foreclose any contract
defense. Instead, the move is to foreclose the application of any contract
defense.
Consider two examples. Suppose one person compliments another’s
dancing performance. There is nothing inherently fraudulent about this
specific fact. If, however, the compliment were disingenuous and made only
to induce the receiver to purchase more dance lessons, then this compliment
may become fraudulent within the context of that exchange.116 Similarly,
suppose one party pays another $450 in exchange for a promise to either
perform some task or return the money. The promise to return the money is
114 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct.
1421, 1426 (2017)).
115 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116 See Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that the
defendant’s statements misrepresenting the plaintiff’s dancing abilities were actionable because the
compliments induced the plaintiff to purchase more dance lessons); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 168–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (discussing when it is reasonable to rely on an assertion
of opinion).
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enforceable—at least generally and in the abstract. But if the payment were
a bribe in exchange for a political favor, then this otherwise innocuous
promise to repay becomes unenforceable as a matter of public policy.117
The lesson of these two examples is simple. Terms or features of the
bargaining process that are innocuous in isolation (such as compliments or
promises to repay) may, within the context of a specific exchange, become
fraudulent, or unconscionable, or against public policy.
The same applies to arbitration. Like a gratuitous compliment or a
simple promise to repay, there is nothing inherently fraudulent or
unconscionable about arbitration. In the context of a specific exchange,
however, an otherwise innocuous arbitration provision may, like a
compliment or promise to repay, become unconscionable or fraudulent.118
Imagine what would happen if the same limit that the Supreme Court
applies to arbitration provisions were applied to the two examples above.
That is, imagine that a party may raise a “generally applicable contract
defense”—but only if the defense does not “derive its meaning” from the fact
that either (1) a compliment or (2) a promise to repay is at issue. How could
either case be argued? How could the victim of a fraudulently induced
dancing lesson actually apply the formation defense of fraud in the
inducement without reference to the compliment? She could not. Or how
could a court refuse to enforce the bribery contract if federal law barred a
public policy defense from “deriv[ing] its meaning” from the fact that a
promise to repay is at issue? It could not. Thus, the Court’s key move—
foreclosing defenses that, when applied, reference any element of
arbitration—prevents parties from applying “generally applicable” defenses.

117

See Sinnar v. Le Roy, 270 P.2d 800 (1954) (finding a contract void for illegality because it
violated state laws about liquor licenses).
118 For example, in Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782–87 (9th Cir.
2002), the Ninth Circuit held that an employment contract’s arbitration provision was unconscionable
because supplemental provisions on fee shifting and the number of allowable depositions
disproportionately impacted the employee.
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This limitation can be (and is) used to shut down common contract defenses,
such as mistake,119 capacity,120 and duress.121
It would be a mistake to interpret the Court’s neutral language as
advancing neutral policy, one that merely treats arbitration provisions like
any other, or, as the Southland court put it, one that honors the “congressional
intent to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts.’”122 Under Prima Paint, a court may only decide “issues relating

119 See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (a claim for
mutual mistake must be resolved by the arbitrator). It is not possible to mount a defense premised on
mistake. A party would have to show not only that the nonexistence of the arbitration provision was a
basic assumption upon which the contract was made but also that enforcing the arbitration provision
would either (a) materially adversely affect her (if the mistake were mutual) or (b) lead to an
“unconscionable” result (if the mistake were unilateral). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 152–54. Neither defense is permissible because it would require a specific holding that compelling
arbitration would, in fact, materially adversely affect one of the parties, and therefore that the arbitral
forum itself is somehow inadequate. Again, such a holding would necessarily “single out” features of the
arbitral process. The Supreme Court has prohibited such reasoning. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S.Ct. at
1428 n.2.
120 A circuit split has emerged on whether the court or the arbitrator should resolve a dispute when
one party raises a capacity defense. Compare Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th
Cir. 2002) (the issue should be resolved by the arbitrator), with Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1286 (10th
Cir. 2003) (the issue should be resolved by the court), and Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys.,
2015 WL 9906264, at 4 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 2015) (same), aff’d, 647 F. App’x 607 (6th Cir. 2016). The
Supreme Court has never heard a capacity case, but it would almost surely hold that such disputes must
be sent to the arbitrator. Capacity applies to the formation of the contract in its entirety, not to the inclusion
of any specific provision. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14 (infancy), 15
(mental illness). The Court’s rule in such instances is categorical: “[U]nless the challenge is to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first
instance.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). For the capacity
defense to apply only to the arbitration clause, it must be that the agreement to arbitrate was formed
separately. That is, it must be that a capable party formed a contract without an arbitration agreement,
subsequently became incapable, and, while incapable, modified the existing contract with the arbitration
agreement.
121 This defense is implausible. A claim that the contract was formed under physical duress or
coercion goes to formation of the contract as a whole. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174.
Again, this defense would be sent to the arbitrator. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). Any other duress defense would require a showing that the aggrieved party
assented only because of another’s “improper threat,” such as a crime or tort, and that the threat left the
aggrieved party with “no reasonable alternative.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175(1)
(improper threat by the counter-party), 175(2) (improper threat by a third party), 176 (defining an
improper threat). But the “alternative” to arbitration is the public courts. Assessing the reasonableness of
this alternative would require a comparison of arbitration and litigation, which in turn would rely on facts
specific to arbitration. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971) (on
economic duress generally). Thus, we are again left with only one contrived possibility: Two parties form
a valid contract without an arbitration provision; then one party physically compels the other to modify it
by including an arbitration provision.
122 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15, 16 n.11 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)); see also Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 423 (Black, J., dissenting) (also quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)).
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to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”123 It must send
any defense relating to the validity of the contract as a whole to an arbitrator.
Yet under Southland and subsequent cases, a defense may not cite any
specific feature of the arbitral forum or the arbitration provision at issue.
In summary, the saving clause of Section 2 of the FAA expressly
provides grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration provision. But,
according to the Supreme Court, a defense that implicates the arbitration
provision is barred, while a defense that does not implicate the arbitration
provision is sent to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court has Catch 22-ed the
saving clause out of existence.
2. The End of State Policies
In a separate opinion to Southland, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, Justice John Paul Stevens anticipated how eliminating the saving clause
would affect a state’s public policy.124 Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority on the first issue: even if Congress intended that the FAA apply
only in federal courts, “intervening developments in the law”—presumably,
Supreme Court precedent—required the Court to hold that the FAA applies
equally in state courts.125 However, Justice Stevens was alarmed by the
Southland majority’s second holding and its casual dismissal of the saving
clause:
For me it is not “clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a
diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been

123 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. An additional issue arises if the challenge is to the arbitration
clause itself: whether the parties agreed to submit questions of arbitrability (as distinct from the
underlying merits) to an arbitrator or to a court. On this issue, the Supreme Court has held that the default
rule is the court. First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Some scholars have argued that First
Options introduces ambiguity into the application of the separability rule and Prima Paint. See, e.g.,
Reuben, supra note 59, at 872–78. But it does not. In First Options, the plaintiff Kaplan had concluded
several related contracts with First Options. Some were in his own name; others were on behalf of his
wholly owned company. Only the latter contract, however, had an arbitration provision. The arbitrability
question was whether the former agreements were also subject to arbitration. 514 U.S. at 940–42. First
Options was therefore the very rare case in which only the formation of the agreement to arbitrate—and
not the formation of the agreement as a whole—was at issue. The FAA unambiguously declares that this
issue is for the court. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (conditioning a court’s duty to specifically enforce an
agreement to arbitrate “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in
issue”) (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C. § 3 (conditioning a court’s duty to stay court proceedings pending
arbitration on the same). This distinction, between the agreement to arbitration versus the agreement as a
whole, is the logic of Prima Paint. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403; see also supra Section I.B.1
(on dubious origins).
124 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Justice Thomas issued a separate concurrence that mirrors the
concerns of Justice Stevens’s separate opinion in Southland, specifically, that the scope of preemption
implicit in the majority’s holding is confusing and threatens to swallow the saving clause. See 563 U.S.
333, 353, 356 (2011).
125 Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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enforceable.” The general rule prescribed by § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
is that arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are
enforceable as a matter of federal law. That general rule, however, is subject to
an exception based on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” I believe that exception leaves room for the
implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be undermined
by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses. 126

Justice Stevens’s warning has proved apt. Even while documenting how
agreements to arbitrate are used to undermine anti-wage-theft policies,
consumer protections, and restrictions on employment noncompetes,127 the
Supreme Court has used Southland to preempt a wide range of state policies
embodied in state common law, state statutes, and state constitutions.128
Indeed, the Court later held that even federal policies cannot trigger the
saving clause.129 Only Justice Stevens noticed that Southland implicitly, and
without reason, held that the FAA preempts the entire class of contract
defenses based on public policy.130
D. Is There Any Limit to Arbitration?
I conclude this Part by identifying a possible limiting principle to the
seemingly unlimited power of arbitrators. I first review the standard of
review of arbitral awards. I then offer a potential limiting principle, based on
a reinterpretation of “manifest disregard,” a judge-made gloss of the FAA’s
standard of review.

126

Id. at 17–18.
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (consumer contracting); id. at 471
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (covenants not to
compete in employment agreements); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)
(consumer credit) and id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (wage
theft) and id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27 (2017) (state
constitution); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339–41 (2011) (state common law); Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (state statute).
129 See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). Early Supreme Court decisions
had suggested that the saving clause might apply if enforcing an arbitration provision would prevent a
party from “effectively . . . vindicat[ing]” a federal cause of action. Id. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247,
273–74 (2009); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). But the Court shut
this down in 2013. It reasoned that “effective vindication” of a federal claim does not require that a person
retain the ability to pursue the federal claim; it merely requires that a person retain the right to bring the
claim. Thus, a court may enforce an arbitration provision even if enforcement disables a party from
actually bringing the federal claim. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 235–38 (holding that the “effective
vindication” exception does not invalidate a class waiver, even if plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating
the federal claim exceeds the potential recovery); see also id. at 239 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
130 Southland, 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127
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1. The Grounds for Appeal
Two key features of arbitration enable parties to escape mandatory
contract law: (1) arbitrator power and (2) award finality. On the first, the
remedial powers of an arbitrator are at least as broad as those of a judge, and
possibly more so.131 On the second, the FAA limits the grounds under which
courts may refuse to enforce an award. These grounds are limited to extreme
procedural defects such as “fraud, . . . evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, . . . [arbitrator] misconduct[,] . . . [and cases in which] the
arbitrators exceeded their powers.”132
The standard of review cannot be altered in contract and leaves no room
to consider the merits of an award.133 Thus, an arbitrator’s award is nearly
unappealable. Egregious errors in law or fact are not sufficient grounds for
review.134 “Of course, decisions procured by the parties through fraud or
through the arbitrator’s dishonesty need not be enforced,” yet “as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”135
2. A Possible Limit: Reinterpreting “Manifest Disregard”
Would any award, regardless of its substance, be enforced so long as it
did not evidence procedural defect? A strict interpretation of both the FAA

131 The overwhelming majority of arbitration agreements provide for arbitration per the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. These rules give power to the arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief
that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.” See
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, R-47(a) (2013). This includes
power to award damages, fees, specific performance and other injunctive relief, as well as power to grant
interim or interlocutory awards. See R-47 (scope of award); R-37 (interim measures); R-38 (emergency
measures).
132 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). The FAA also provides that a court may modify an award in scrivener’s
error-type cases such as “evident material miscalculation of figures,” or to excise a portion of an award
“[w]here the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them.” Id. § 11.
133 In Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court held that FAA’s grounds for review “may [not] be
supplemented by contract.” 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (referring to Section 9). But see Maureen A.
Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 949–51 (2010) (analyzing the possibility for parties to draft creative
contracts that expand court review of arbitration awards); Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around
Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 911–16 (2010) (same). The majority’s reasoning was mostly
premised on the text of the FAA, which, it correctly notes, “carries no hint of flexibility.” Hall Street,
552 U.S. at 587. Predictably, however, Hall Street also relied on the usual “national policy favoring
arbitration” rationale. The statutory standard of review, it concluded, “substantiat[es] a national policy
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway.” Id. at 588.
134 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585–86.
135 United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
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and Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that, no matter how
egregious the error in law, a court must confirm the award.
Yet there must be some limit. At the very least, there are limits outside
of arbitration law that would deter a party from asking a court to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate. These include, for example, laws that attach criminal
liability to price-fixing or human-trafficking agreements.136 Further, even if
an arbitrator awarded damages for breach of a price-fixing or humantrafficking scheme, it seems unlikely that any court would confirm it. This
much seems obvious.
But why is this obvious? Is it because there exists some limiting
principle within the FAA or the Supreme Court’s arbitration precedent?
Strictly speaking, I think not.
There is, however, one doctrine—the “manifest disregard” standard—
that, though courts do not expressly declare it as such, I would reinterpret as
a limiting principle that responds to this concern. Manifest disregard is a
judge-made standard to review arbitration awards. The phrase comes from
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan.137
The Second Circuit interpreted Wilko as introducing a standard for
vacatur outside the FAA. The Second Circuit admitted that the bounds of the
new manifest disregard standard were not well-defined,138 yet “it clearly
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law”139—that
is, more than what the FAA allows. The Second Circuit eventually fashioned
a two-prong test consisting of objective and subjective components, both of
which must be met before a court may refuse to confirm the award.140 The
objective prong asks “whether the governing law alleged to have been

136 See, e.g., Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1. In rare cases, some lower courts have
refused to enforce an award on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Connecticut v. AFSCME, Council 4,
Local 387, AFL-CIO, 747 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2000); see also Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and
Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1113–14 (2009) (discussing such cases). Given
the Supreme Court’s rejection of unconscionability in Concepcion and its categorical statement on the
exclusivity of the grounds for review in Hall Street, it seems likely that, were it to review such cases, the
Supreme Court would reverse any lower court refusing to enforce an award on nonstatutory grounds.
137 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp.,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). As the Supreme Court later summarized:

The Wilko Court was explaining that arbitration would undercut the Securities Act’s buyer
protections when it remarked (citing FAA § 10) that “[p]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is
limited,” and went on to say that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to
manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation.”
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37) (internal citations omitted).
138 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
139 Id.
140 Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2002).
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ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable.”141 The subjective prong “look[s] to the knowledge actually
possessed by the arbitrator” and asks whether “the arbitrator appreciated the
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore or pay
no attention to it.”142
The Supreme Court, however, resisted interpreting manifest disregard
as something more than what the FAA allows. In Hall Street v. Mattel,143 one
of the litigants asked the Supreme Court to recognize manifest disregard as
separate grounds for vacating awards.144 The Court declined, equating this
with a request for “general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.”145 Yet the
Court equivocated. It wondered aloud whether Wilko’s phrase introduced
new grounds for review or was merely a shorthand reference to the statutory
grounds collectively.146
Given its categorical holding that “the statutory grounds [for vacatur]
are exclusive,”147 some courts concluded that manifest disregard did not
survive Hall Street.148 Others, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion,
and the issue arose again in the 2010 case of Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.149
The Second Circuit had reasoned that while manifest disregard was not a
separate, non-statutory grounds for review, it nevertheless survived Hall
Street as a “judicial gloss” on the statutory grounds of Section 10.150 The
Second Circuit then applied the manifest disregard “gloss” to vacate an
arbitration award.151

141

Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 934) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Id.
143 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
144 Id. at 584.
145 Id. at 585.
146 Id.; see also Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1191–93
(2009) (explaining how the Supreme Court’s dicta created uncertainty among the lower courts).
147 552 U.S. at 578.
148 See, for example, the discussion in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94
(2d Cir. 2008).
149 559 U.S. 662, 670 (2010).
150 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94, rev’d and remanded sub nom. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
151 The Second Circuit explained:
142

Like the Seventh Circuit, we view the “manifest disregard” doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a
mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial review of the
arbitrators’ decision. We must therefore continue to bear the responsibility to vacate arbitration
awards in the rare instances in which the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal principle,
appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari but again avoided the manifest
disregard question by affirming the Second Circuit decision on statutory
grounds. It held that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers by expressly
basing the award on its own public policy judgment (instead of on applicable
law).152 Further, it expressly declined to decide whether manifest disregard
survived Hall Street,153 though it did awkwardly leave the door open by
asserting that, if the standard did apply, it would have been satisfied in this
case.154
I think the Stolt-Nielsen Court unintentionally but effectively
incorporates a limiting principle into the statutory grounds for vacatur. It
accomplished this by holding, as a matter of law, that an arbitration panel
which imposes its own policy choice “exceeds its powers” under
Section 10.155 In this way, Stolt-Nielsen smuggles the subjective prong of
manifest disregard—that “the arbitrator must appreciate the existence of a
clearly governing legal principle but decide[] to ignore or pay no attention to
it”156—into one of the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur, namely,
excession of powers.157
Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (alterations omitted). The Second Circuit’s argument is flawed. Stripped to
its essentials, it offers prudential grounds for the proposition that something akin to “willful
misapplication of the law” should be grounds for vacating an award. This argument ignores Hall Street’s
holding that the statutory grounds are exclusive. However, the Second Circuit’s conclusion—that
manifest disregard survives Hall Street—could be supported. A more logically sound argument would
support that conclusion by reasoning either (1) the statutory grounds in Section 10 collectively imply
manifest disregard, or (2) manifest disregard is a specific instance of one of Section 10’s grounds. Indeed,
on (2), one could argue that “willful misapplication of the law” is an instance of one of the statutory
grounds in Section 10(4), namely, the case in which “the arbitrators . . . so imperfectly executed [their
powers] that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012).
152 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676–77.
153 Id. at 672 n.3.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 677.
156 Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations and
alterations omitted).
157 Excession of powers was traditionally equated with “exceeding the submission,” that is, the case
in which an arbitrator decided on issues that were not properly submitted for arbitration, either because
the parties themselves did not request an award on the issue, or because it is outside of the scope of the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 419, 430–31 (1866).
After the FAA, the Supreme Court held close to the understanding that excession of powers is limited to
cases in which the arbitrator strays from the agreement.
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the [agreement]; he does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the [agreement].
When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award.
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This limiting principle, however, has its own limits. It is based not on
an arbitrator’s actual knowledge that the award is not based on applicable
law, but rather on the arbitrator’s normative vision of applicable law.158 Thus,
this principle would not apply to an arbitrator who interprets a choice of law
provision as valid (even if a court would not) and then applies that law to
enforce the contract. Moreover, the principle would require some record of
the arbitrator’s reasoning—yet arbitrators are under no obligation to create
one, or indeed provide any reason to support their award.159
A more robust limiting principle would be based not on subjective but
on constructive knowledge, though, to be fair, such a standard might risk
relitigation of every award. In any event, it remains to be seen precisely how
this limiting principle applies to cases in which there is no evidence of the
arbitrator’s subjective beliefs or reasoning.
E. Conclusion
In summary, this Part chronicled the rise of federal arbitration
preemption and the concomitant decline in states’ authority to craft and
enforce contract law. These developments, however, have practical effect
only to the extent that contract parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. To the
best of my knowledge, no previous study has presented nationally
representative figures documenting the extent to which parties agree to
arbitrate. The next Part thus endeavors to provide such figures for the first
time.
II. NEW EVIDENCE ON THE PERVASIVENESS OF
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
This Part presents new evidence on the pervasiveness of employment
arbitration. Section A describes the data collection process, and Section B
presents the results.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). But in Stolt-Nielsen,
the Court seized upon the language of an arbitrator “dispens[ing] his own brand of industrial justice” in
its holding that straying from the agreement includes, in effect, straying from the application of the law.
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671–72.
158 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 (“[T]he task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract,
not to make public policy.”). There are a handful of other, though much rarer, nonstatutory grounds upon
which some lower courts have refused to enforce an award. See Reuben, supra note 136, at 1113–16
(summarizing these grounds).
159 Both U.S. courts and the American Arbitration Association leave it to the discretion of the parties
and the arbitrator. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 598 (“Arbitrators have no obligation
to the court to give their reasons for an award.”); see also Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association, R-46(b) (2013) (“The arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the
parties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless the arbitrator
determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.”).
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A. Data Collection
I used standard natural language processing tools to create a dataset of
roughly 800,000 contracts from all U.S. public companies between 1996 and
2016. The contracts come from filings submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). In general, a company must file reports to the
SEC if it has made a public offering or has “total assets exceeding
$10,000,000 and a class of equity security . . . held [by at least] 2,000
persons.”160 Companies that report to the SEC must disclose any “contract
not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the
[company].”161 This includes, among others, contracts to which directors and
officers are parties.162 Companies report material contracts by attaching them
as exhibits to filings submitted to the SEC, such as on the periodic and
interim reports submitted through forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K.163 The SEC
makes all filings since 1996 available online on the EDGAR database.164
To recover the contracts, I wrote a program to search through all SEC
filings. SEC filings use a unique code to identify material contracts.165 Thus,
this process recovered every contract disclosed to the SEC since 1996. I then
parsed each contract for several variables: contract type, arbitration
provision, and choice of law. The sample only includes contracts that are
governed by the law of a U.S. state. Also, in the table below, I report the
results for arbitration rates separately for the fifteen most common contract
categories. These include fourteen distinct categories and a fifteenth category
for “other.”

160

Securities Exchange Act § 12(g); 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2018). Any “material contract or plan of acquisition, reorganization,
arrangement, liquidation or succession . . . [must] be filed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q or Form 10-K.”
17 § C.F.R. 229.601(a)(4). In response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2012),
which calls for “real time issuer disclosures,” the SEC has required firms to disclose a summary of any
“material definitive agreement not made in the ordinary course of business.” See Securities and Exchange
Commission, Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date
[Release Nos. 33-8400; 34-49424; File No. S7-22-02], SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 25, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm [https://perma.cc/V7NU-3DWJ].
162 Reporting companies must disclose contracts “to which directors, officers, promoters, voting
trustees . . . or underwriters are parties,” “upon which the registrant’s business is substantially
dependent,” “[involving] the acquisition or sale of any property . . . exceeding 15 percent of [the
company’s] fixed assets,” and “[a]ny management contract or . . . compensatory plan.” 17 § C.F.R.
229.601(b)(10)(ii)(A)–(D)(iii)(A).
163 Reporting companies must file these forms pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
164 Filing
& Forms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml [https://perma.cc/FBA3-29JB]. For a handful of companies, the earliest
forms available online are from 1993.
165 Specifically, registrants follow a numbering convention to distinguish material contracts from
other types of exhibits. The code for material contracts is “Exhibit 10.”
161
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A human-coded audit was conducted to check the accuracy of the
machine coding. The audit checked the accuracy of the algorithm for choice
of law and arbitration for 1000 randomly selected contracts. The algorithm
successfully coded the choice of law clause for 98.1% of contracts. It also
successfully coded the arbitration clause for 99.3% of contracts.
B. Results
Table 2 shows how arbitration rates vary by contract type. There are
791,362 total contracts in the sample. The average arbitration rate across all
contracts is 19%.
Employment agreements have the highest rate of arbitration, at 42%.
The type of contract least likely to include an arbitration provision is credit
agreements, at 4%. Employment agreements and credit agreements are also
the two most common types of contracts in the sample. Each account for
about 20% of all contracts disclosed to the SEC.
TABLE 2: ARBITRATION RATE BY CONTRACT TYPE
Arbitration Rate

Share of Total

Employment
Joint Venture
Service
Settlement
Consulting
Lease
Merger

0.42
0.31
0.30
0.27
0.24
0.21
0.21

0.18
0.01
0.05
0.09
0.02
0.03
0.01

Number of
Contracts
140,980
4,869
39,592
74,953
13,957
27,467
9,561

Purchase
Other
Insurance
Shareholders
Agreement
Pension
Partnership
Negotiable
Instrument
Credit
Total

0.18
0.17
0.17
0.16

0.10
0.09
0.05
0.01

79,459
67,880
36,328
7,878

0.14
0.14
0.05

0.02
0.01
0.12

13,731
10,623
96,561

0.04
0.19

0.21
1.00

167,523
791,362

Figure 2 presents the trend in arbitration rates over time. Specifically, it
graphs the arbitration rate each year, separately for employment agreements
and all others. “All others” thus includes the fourteen categories besides
employment. The arbitration rate for employment and non-employment
contracts has been roughly constant for the last twenty years.
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I draw two conclusions from these data. First, employment arbitration
is common, both in an absolute and relative sense. Second, given the stability
of employment arbitration rates over time, it seems likely that employment
arbitration will remain common in the future.
C. The Principal Challenge of Machine Learning in Empirical
Legal Studies
Finally, it is worth reflecting on a limitation of this empirical section.
The empirical section was initially motivated by the case of Nitro-Lift v.
Howard (discussed in the Introduction), in which an employer used
arbitration to enforce an otherwise invalid noncompete provision. In
previous work, I had found that noncompetes were common even in
jurisdictions that expressly void them.166 The initial goal of the empirical
section was thus to investigate the relationship between arbitration and
noncompete provisions using machine learning protocols.
This goal, however, was not realized. A hand-coding audit revealed that
the typical words and phrases used to craft noncompete provisions
substantially overlapped with those of other common secrecy provisions,
such as nonsolicitation and confidentiality provisions. For this reason, the
standard machine learning protocols that successfully identified employment
agreements and arbitration provisions were relatively unsuccessful at
distinguishing noncompetes from other secrecy provisions.
This example speaks to a more general challenge—perhaps the
principal challenge—facing scholars who use machine learning protocols to
study legal texts. Loosely speaking, one might imagine a spectrum of
questions to ask of a legal text, ranging from the very specific to the very
general. On one extreme lie questions involving specific facts, such as: “Did
the parties choose litigation or arbitration?” or “Who is the plaintiff?” On the
other extreme lie questions involving very general concepts, such as: “Is this
an employment contract?” or “Is this a judicial opinion?”
In my view, the literature has tended toward questions at these extremes
because they are relatively well-suited to machine learning protocols—but
the real action lies in the middle ground. In the middle ground are questions
such as: “Have the parties agreed not to compete with each other?” or “Does
the judicial opinion approve the use of legislative history?” These questions,
while susceptible to reliable human coding, are tricky for the machine
because they demand precise applications of broad concepts—such as
“competition” or “statutory interpretation”—that evade algorithmic

166 See Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 650
(2018).
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definition. Answering these questions with machine learning protocols
would effectively enable scholars to apply (rudimentary) legal reasoning at
scale. Thus, the challenge for the emerging literature that applies machine
learning techniques is to resist the temptation of low-hanging questions lying
at the extremes, and instead develop methods for addressing the more
stubborn, yet perhaps more fruitful, questions that live in the middle.
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF CONTRACTS WITH ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
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III. WHAT STATES CAN DO
In this Part, I outline a new strategy for states in response to the
problems outlined in Part I. Federal arbitration law effectively eliminates
states’ ability to enforce, or monitor enforcement of, their own laws in
contract actions. Section A describes the proposed solution: Focus on
deterring the formation of contracts that, if performed, would contravene
state policy. Section B uses two examples to explore the details of
implementing this strategy.
A. The Strategy: Deterrence over Enforcement
States cannot directly regulate arbitration, and the only way to change
this is through congressional action. Congress has previously limited the
scope of the FAA in several contexts, such as in motor vehicle franchise
agreements, consumer credit agreements, whistleblower-related actions, and
sales of securities (though some federal laws limiting the scope of the FAA
were later repealed).167 But recent efforts to enact limits to the FAA’s reach
167 See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (invaliding agreements to
arbitrate that would otherwise interfere with the Act’s whistleblower incentives); Military Lending Act,
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in the workplace, particularly to prohibit forced arbitration of sexual
harassment, have been unsuccessful. Given the current congressional
climate, it seems unlikely that these initiatives will be successful in the near
future.168
States, however, can act without Congress. To do so, they must change
the way they enforce policies. Rather than relying on contract enforcement
(or nonenforcement), states should deter formation of contracts that
contravene public policy. I next consider two examples. The first example
shows how states can indirectly enforce state policies on noncompetes by
deterring parties from forming noncompete agreements (rather than directly
enforcing the policy in contract actions). The second example shows how
states can prevent mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims by deterring
formation of certain types of arbitration agreements.
B. Example 1: Indirect Enforcement
1. The Case of Covenants Not to Compete
States place a variety of limits on the enforceability of noncompetes.
Some states, such as California and Oklahoma, void noncompetes outright.169
Nearly all other states enforce covenants not to compete in employment
contracts as long as the restriction is “reasonable.” The reasonableness test

10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer credit contracts
with service members and their dependents); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2012) (granting the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to regulate
arbitration agreements between securities dealers and their customers and prohibiting lenders from
including mandatory arbitration provisions in mortgage contracts) (implemented by 12 C.F.R.
§ 1026.36(h) but later repealed by Pub. L. No: 115-74 of November 1, 2017); see also Exec. Order No.
13,673 of July 31, 2014, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309 (Aug. 5, 2014) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration of certain
federal procurement contracts) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,782 of Mar. 27, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg.
15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017)); Motor Vehicle Franchise Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)
(2012) (providing that predispute arbitration provisions in motor vehicle franchise contracts are
unenforceable).
168 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Restoring Statutory
Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550; 115th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2017). Section 2(a)(4) of
the latter provides a statement of congressional intent: “States have a compelling interest in enacting
rights and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens, and the Federal Arbitration Act should not be,
and should not have been, interpreted to preempt State legislation that enacted rights and remedies to
protect the welfare of their citizens.”
169 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2018) (providing that “every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void”). California courts have emphasized that there are no exceptions to this rule. See Whyte v. Schlage
Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1462–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow restraint” exception). Montana,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma also have similar blanket prohibitions. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703
(2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West 2018).
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is typically formulated as a limitation on the time and geographic scope of
the noncompete.170
The economic rationale for limiting freedom of contract in this way can
be divided into two categories: to protect parties inside the contract and to
protect parties outside the contract.171 On the first, limiting enforcement of
noncompetes protects vulnerable employees with little or no bargaining
power. These employees are unlikely to have access to counsel, and therefore
may not appreciate precisely how noncompetes limit their future
employment. Indeed, a large body of empirical literature documents that
laypersons do not read agreements or understand their contractual
liabilities.172 Thus, many employees may not even be aware that they are
subject to a noncompete. Limiting enforcement of noncompetes also protects
parties outside the contract. Noncompetes negatively affect society, as other
employers are unable to hire persons subject to noncompetes. Thus, a policy
of not enforcing noncompetes promotes labor market mobility and
information spillovers, both of which generate innovation.173 However,
noncompetes may also produce welfare benefits. For example, they may
incentivize employers to invest in their employees’ human capital.174 An
optimal policy, therefore, must balance these competing interests.
The problem with states’ noncompete policies, however, is that they are
unenforceable in practice. Private parties can contract around them with
arbitration and choice of law. This was the issue in Nitro-Lift v. Howard, as
discussed in the Introduction.175 That case involved an employee from
Oklahoma, where noncompetes are categorically banned. The simple runaround required the employee to arbitrate under the laws of a jurisdiction that
permits noncompetes—in that case, Louisiana. If the contract did not include
an arbitration provision and were instead litigated, an Oklahoma state court
would invalidate the choice of law provision, apply Oklahoma law, and thus
170 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976) (“[A] restrictive
covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area,
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not
unreasonably burdensome to the employee.”).
171 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989).
172 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading
Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014).
173 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (arguing that
California’s noncompete policy would have such effects).
174 See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive
Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011).
175 568 U.S. 17 (2012).
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void the noncompete. One might think that Oklahoma law would still be
enforced so long as the arbitrator applies the correct conflict of laws analysis.
The problem is that an arbitrator may not be so inclined. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has all but encouraged arbitrators to ignore conflict of laws.176
2. The Policy Strategy
Given that the Supreme Court has effectively enabled parties to opt out
of state policy, what should states do? Since states can do nothing about
enforcement, the answer is that they should instead deter formation of
noncompete agreements. For example, a state could issue civil fines against
employers that form noncompetes with employees and enforce this by
offering employees whistleblower rewards to report violations. The essential
legal feature of this approach is that it creates a structure in which vindicating
the policy (that is, eliminating noncompetes) does not require an action in
contract. The creation of such a mechanism is necessary, since these actions
will be sent to arbitration and cannot be monitored.
More generally, states should develop clear rules concerning
noncompetes, and then prohibit formation of contracts that do not adhere to
these rules. In this way, states may calibrate their noncompete policy without
relying on arbitration for enforcement. Instead of using the ubiquitous
“reasonableness” test of most jurisdictions, states should enact simple rules
as to time and geography. For example, the maximum scope for, say, New
York, might be “two years, within the state of New York, and within an
industry defined by the Global Industrial Standard Classification.” Then,
New York could adopt the same mechanism—a whistleblower incentive for
employees—to deter formation of agreements that exceed these clear limits.
No state has expressly adopted such an approach, but some states have
come close. In the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, Illinois recently prohibited
noncompetes for “low-wage” employees (defined by the employee’s hourly

176

In its concluding paragraph in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court explains why:

We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process
somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context. Arbitration agreements allow
parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in
employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning
commercial contracts. These litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the
courts) would be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often presented in
disputes arising from the employment relationship, and the necessity of bifurcation of proceedings
in those cases where state law precludes arbitration of certain types of employment claims but not
others.
532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). It added that arbitration generally
avoids the “complexity and uncertainty” of such issues. Id.
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wages).177 The problem with this law is that it was not coupled with an easy
mechanism for private enforcement—i.e., whistleblower incentives of the
kind explained above. Further, there is no clear schedule of fines associated
with violations. There is therefore little to deter employers from flouting the
prohibition, especially against uninformed employees.
The first high-profile suit brought by the Illinois Attorney General
under the shadow of the new Illinois statute demonstrates its limits.178 The
suit challenged the sandwich chain Jimmy John’s and its practice of
including noncompetes in its contracts with rank-and-file employees.179
Illinois’s position was that these noncompetes were not permitted under
existing common law.180
Jimmy John’s “defense” was that, even if the noncompetes were
unenforceable, it never tried to enforce the noncompete.181 This is nonsense.
The power of a noncompete against a rank-and-file employee is in the threat,
not the execution. Thus, an employer could include the provision in a
standard form contract, never enforce it, and still discourage at least some
employees from competing. Further, even a sophisticated rank-and-file
employee who knows her legal obligations may hesitate to “breach” this
unenforceable agreement, if only for fear of costly arbitration. In the
settlement, Jimmy John’s agreed to pay $100,000 to raise awareness of the
new noncompete law. Without a robust whistleblower regime, however, it is
difficult to see how this will deter future violations of the new statute.

177 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/10 (West 2018). The Act was passed partially in response to
Illinois courts’ increased scrutiny of employment noncompetes. See, e.g., Fifield v. Premier Dealership
Servs., 993 N.E.2d 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
178 The new statute did not apply to this case. The Jimmy John’s suit settled in December 2016, while
the new statute applied only to contracts formed on or after January 1, 2017.
179 See Complaint, People v. Jimmy John’s Enters., LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 8,
2016), available at https://will.illinois.edu/nfs/JimmyJohnsComplaintFILED.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J2DV-Q27E].
180 Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan claimed that Jimmy John’s “lack[ed] any legitimate
business interest to justify the [noncompete] agreements, the agreements [were] not supported by
adequate consideration, and the agreements [were] not narrowly tailored.” Id. at 2.
181 Jimmy John’s cited a similar case filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, in which employees of Jimmy John’s sought a declaratory judgment to determine the
enforceability of the noncompete. The court held that the employees lacked standing to pursue the claim
because they did not allege that Jimmy John’s had enforced the noncompete against them at any point in
the past, and because they did not possess “a reasonable fear of litigation.” See Brunner v. Liautaud, No.
14-C-5509, 2015 WL 5086388, at *24–31 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015).
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C. Example 2: Preventing (Mandatory) Arbitration
1. The Case of Civil Rights Claims
Arbitration provisions in employment contracts are typically broad in
scope, providing for arbitration for “any dispute” that arises during
employment. Until recently, it was not clear whether such provisions could
lawfully include all civil rights claims.
The question was settled in 1991. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that employers and employees can
specifically enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.182 Then, later in the same year,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In it, Congress specifically
encourages arbitration of all civil rights claims: “Where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, . . . and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.”183 To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first express statement by the Congress in support of
a “national policy favoring arbitration.”
Employers and employees are both enabled and encouraged to keep
civil rights claims out of public courts. Yet states and the public have an
interest in encouraging the opposite. They have an interest in both
monitoring enforcement of civil rights in the workplace and affording
employees certain procedural protections. Given these interests, how can
states bring civil rights disputes back into public courts?
2. The Policy Strategy
The strategy is to craft a law that does not interfere with the arbitral
process—and therefore avoids preemption. Any law must allow arbitration
of civil rights claims to proceed. For example, a simple law prohibiting
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims—such as the one recently
passed by New York184—would, if challenged, surely be preempted by the
FAA.
Further complicating the issue, even if states could prohibit arbitration
of all civil rights claims, it is not obvious whether they should. Some
employees may prefer to arbitrate their civil rights claims, and so compelling
182

500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); see also Mara Kent, “Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil
Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 97–99 (2005) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
184 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 2018); see also California measure AB 3080, introduced into the
senate on March 31, 2018 (proposed state legislation to prohibit forced arbitration of sexual harassment
claims).
183
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public litigation in such cases may only compound the harm. In principle,
therefore, state policy should be designed to empower employees to choose
their forum after the dispute has arisen, or, equivalently, to incentivize
employers to grant employees this option.
States can achieve this by first prohibiting civil rights as a subject matter
for contracts. After enacting this prohibition, the law could then carve out an
exemption for post-dispute agreements so that parties may still settle existing
claims. An example of such a law is as follows:
(1) No person shall enter into an agreement with any employee concerning the
civil rights of the employee. All such agreements are illegal and void.
(2) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements concerning existing legal claims.

Private enforcement could then proceed as in the noncompete example.
For example, employees could be empowered to bring a qui tam action on
behalf of the state to enforce the law. Even if a state does not intervene, these
actions cannot be sent to arbitration.185 To implement this, states can simply
copy existing state and federal statutes that enable qui tam actions.186
This law is not preempted by the FAA for several reasons. First, the law
does not “derive [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is
at issue.”187 Rather, it derives its meaning from the fact that the subject matter
of the agreement relates to the employee’s civil rights. Indeed, employers
can violate this law with or without requiring employees to arbitrate civil
rights disputes; further, employers may still require employees to arbitrate
civil rights disputes even under this law.
To see this, consider the following examples. Suppose an employment
contract prohibits the employee from disclosing any instance of sexual
harassment. This contract violates the law regardless of whether it includes
an arbitration agreement, and so the employer would be subject to civil
penalties. Next suppose an employment contract includes an agreement to
arbitrate and the employee files suit against the employer alleging sexual
harassment. Under the FAA, a court would be compelled to submit the claim
185 In Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386–87 (2014), the Supreme Court of
California held that employees cannot waive their right to bring representative claims under California’s
Private Attorneys General Act—that is, claims seeking civil penalties against employers for labor code
violations against other employees—because those claims belong to, and are brought on behalf of, the
state, which is not a party to the employment contract; see also Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc.,
803 F.3d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Iskanian rule is not preempted by the FAA).
186 See, e.g., California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 2698–2699.5; California’s False Claims Act, CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12650 (West 2005); Federal False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
187 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987).
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to arbitration—leaving the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration may
procced. The proposed law does nothing to alter this result. Instead, it only
subjects the employer to fines that the state itself may collect directly from
the employer. Again, these fines are not a consequence of the arbitration
agreement. They arise because the employer contracted over the employee’s
civil rights.
The law also does not interfere with the “fundamental attributes” of
arbitration or “disfavor[] contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the
defining features of arbitration agreements.”188 The law does not regulate any
aspect of the arbitral process or enable a court to refuse to enforce an
arbitration agreement under any circumstance.
Though this Article does not advocate it, it is worth considering an even
simpler approach: prohibiting employment contracts altogether. There are
many legal and economic arguments one might make against such a “brute
force” law. Yet there is no argument that such a law would be preempted by
the FAA since, as per the Supreme Court’s requirement,189 it expressly
applies to “any” contract. It does not “single out” arbitration.190
Finally, it is worth observing that policies like the one suggested here—
that is, prohibitions of certain classes of contracts—are commonplace. Two
examples that come to mind are prohibitions on agreements to collude
among competitors191 and prohibitions on bribery contracts between
American companies and foreign governments.192
CONCLUSION
This Article showed how the last fifty years of Supreme Court
arbitration jurisprudence has effectively enabled employers and employees
to opt out of mandatory state law. It also presented new evidence on the
pervasiveness of employment arbitration by parsing millions of filings with
the SEC to create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts. Among all types of
contracts—purchases, joint ventures, credit agreements, and others—
employment agreements are by far the most likely to include an arbitration
provision.

188 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017); see also Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 344 (holding that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA”).
189 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
190 Id. at 1646 (“States may enforce generally applicable rules so long as they do not single out
arbitration for disfavored treatment.” (citing Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1428 n.2)).
191 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
192 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, (a)–(b) (2012).
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In response to these trends, I offered a new strategy to states to regulate
arbitration. Federal law would preempt any direct state effort to regulate
arbitration or prohibit employment disputes from being arbitrated. I therefore
proposed that states abandon contract enforcement as a policy lever, and
instead focus on deterring formation of contracts that would undermine state
policy.
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